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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
//1A-12/23/83 
TOWN OF CHILI. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-6597 
AFSCME, NEW YORK COUNCIL 66. 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD WINTERMAN. for Respondent 
MICHAEL A. TREMONT. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
AFSCME. New York Council 66 (AFSCME) complained that the 
Town of Chili (Town) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by 
charging employees for part of the cost of their health and 
accident insurance. It asserted that the charge constituted a 
unilateral change from a noncontributory health insurance 
program to a contributory program. The hearing officer found 
that the Town had violated its duty to negotiate with AFSCME. 
and the matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the Town. 
The Town acknowledges that the unit employees were charged 
for part of the cost of their health and accident insurance 
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after January 1, 1983, but not before that date, and that the 
change was not negotiated. Its exceptions, however, make three 
arguments. The Town first argues that the hearing officer 
erred in deciding the case on an incomplete record. It then 
argues that the hearing officer erred in concluding that the 
unit employees had enjoyed a noncontributory health and 
accident insurance program, and that the premium charge after 
January 1, 1983 changed the nature of the insurance program.. 
Finally, it argues that its decision to charge unit employees 
was made before AFSCME had been recognized or certified as the 
representative of the unit employees and that the hearing 
officer, therefore, erred in finding that it had been obligated 
to negotiate with AFSCME at that time. 
We reject each of the arguments. The record consists of a 
stipulation of facts prepared by AFSCME and signed by the 
Town. That stipulation was twice modified to satisfy the Town 
before it was signed. The Town cannot now be heard to complain 
about the evidentiary inadequacy of the record. 
While acknowledging that it had paid 100% of the health 
and accident insurance premiums before January 1983, the Town 
contends that this does not evidence the existence of a 
noncontributory insurance program. Rather, it contends, it had 
paid an amount of money for insurance coverage that came to 
100% of the premiums between April 1978 and December 1982. The 
emphasis, however, according to the Town, was on the amount of 
..... umn 
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money paid and not the percentage of premium costs. Thus, 
according to the Town, when the cost of insurance premiums rose 
in January 1983. it was not required to increase the amount of 
its premium payments but could pass that increase on to its 
employees. 
There is no record evidence to support this interpretation 
of the Town's past practice. The sole relevant reference in 
the parties' stipulation is that: 
Since 1975 the Employer has been providing 
its employees. ... with blue cross/blue 
shield coverage at no cost to the employees. 
In sum, the Employer paid 100% of the costs 
of the coverage. 
We therefore affirm the determination of the hearing officer 
that the employees had continuously enjoyed noncontributory 
health and accident insurance coverage before being charged 
for such coverage in January 1983. 
The following chronology is significant with respect to 
the District's substantive contention that its unilateral 
decision to charge unit employees for part of their health 
and accident insurance premiums was not inconsistent with its 
Taylor Law duty to negotiate with AFSCME. AFSCME filed a 
representation petition on September 9, 1982, and was 
successful in an election held on December 17, 1982. The 
Town had notice of all phases of the representation 
proceeding, had signed the tally of ballots on December 17, 
1982, and filed no objection to the conduct of that election. 
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We certified AFSCME as the representative of the unit 
employees on December 30, 1982. On that same day the Town 
issued a memorandum notifying all unit employees that 
effective two days later it would not be responsible for the 
payment of insurance premium increases. Thereafter, on 
January 14, 1983. unit employees were first charged for rate 
increases that took effect on January 1, 1983. 
Section 209-a.l(d) provides that it is improper for a 
public employer "to refuse to negotiate in good faith with 
the duly recognized or certified representatives of its 
public employees". The Town argues that its decision not to 
absorb increases in health and accident insurance premiums 
was made on November 30, 1982, and that the unilateral 
change, if any, occurred before AFSCME had been certified. 
There is no record evidence to support this argument. 
Moreover, any internal and noncommunicated determination to 
change the terms and conditions of employment of its 
employees does not constitute such a change. 
According to the record, the first public indication of 
the change was the Town's issuance of a memorandum on 
December 30, 1982 announcing its decision to make that 
change. However, for the purpose of determining whether the 
change constitutes a violation of §209-a.l(d). the 
significant date is January 1. 1983, when the charges to 
employees for the rate increases first took effect, and not 
?.i 
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December 30, 1982, Deer Park, UFSD. 14 PERB V3028 (1981).-
While the Town may not have known of the official 
certification at the time it issued its memorandum or even 
when the new employee charges became effective, it was aware 
of material facts sufficient to preclude it from denying any 
obligation to negotiate with AFSCME. It knew that AFSCME had 
been successful in an election two weeks earlier; it signed 
the tally of ballots, and it filed no objections to the 
conduct of the election. Accordingly, it should have known 
that AFSCME was in fact the acknowledged negotiating 
representative and that the official and merely ministerial 
act of certification of AFSCME was imminent. Under these 
circumstances, it had an obligation to refrain from acting 
unilaterally and thus confronting the chosen representative 
with a seemingly irreversible act. 
NOW THEREFORE. WE ORDER the Town of Chili 
(1) to cease and desist from enforcing its 
memorandum of December 30, 1982 requiring unit 
employees to pay increases in health insurance 
benefits. 
(2) to reimburse unit employees for any health and 
accident insurance premiums they have paid since 
i^The December 30, 1982 date would have been 
significant if there had been a question of timeliness of 
the charge. 
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January 1, 1983 with interest at 9% per annum, 
(3) to negotiate in good faith with AFSCME regarding 
the payment of health and accident insurance 
premiums, and 
(4) to post notices in the form attached in all 
locations normally used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: December 23, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^ / d S k ^ o , 
Ida Klaus , Member 
David C. Randies , /Member 
w <3;vj'jM 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Town of Chili in the unit represented by 
AFSCME, New York Council 66, that the Town of Chili will: 
1. Not enforce its memorandum of December 30, 1982 requiring unit 
employees to pay increases in health insurance benefits; 
2. Reimburse unit employees for any health and accident insurance 
. premiums they have paid since January 1, 1983 with interest at 
9% per annum; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with AFSCME regarding the payment of 
health and accident insurance premiums. 
Town of Chili 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. Of*00 
s;r oboo 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WELLS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
WELLS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
Charging Party. 
WILLIAM H. INTEMMANN, JR., ESQ., for Respondent. 
KEVIN BERRY, for Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Wells 
Teachers Association, NYSUT (Association) to a hearing 
officer's decision dismissing a specification of its charge 
against the Wells Central School District (District). The 
specification of the charge alleges that the District violated 
Section 209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by unilaterally deciding 
to hold school on June 1. 1982, thus increasing the number of 
teacher work days from 180 to 181.- The District's school 
calendar had designated June 1, 1982 as a possible day off, 
depending on the number of snow days used. 
•1/The hearing officer found merit in a second 
specification of the charge which alleged that the District 
refused to negotiate the impact of its unilateral change. 
There were no exceptions to this finding. 
//1B-12/23/83 
CASE NO. U - 6 3 57 
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Although the condition for June 1 being a day off had 
been satisfied, the District announced on May 13, 1982 that 
June 1 would be a regular school day. The charge herein was 
filed on September 29, 1982, more than four months after May 
13, 1982. Applying Section 204.1(a) of the Rules of this -
Board, the hearing officer determined that this specification 
of the charge had not been timely filed. 
The Association argues that the hearing officer erred in 
concluding that the District's announcement on May 13 was the 
conclusive unilateral action which set the limitation period 
running. It contends that the unilateral action in fact took 
place on the last day of school, when the teachers actually 
worked their 181st day. At any time until then, according to 
the Association, the June 1 day could have been offset by a 
compensatory day off. Alternatively, the Association argues 
that the violation occurred on June 1, when they were reguired 
to work. 
We reject this argument. The record establishes that the 
Association's President was notified on May 13. 1982 that the 
teachers would be reguired to work on June 1, 1982, and that 
this assignment was intended to increase the total number of 
2/ teacher work days from 180 to 181.— The notice was the 
I/This notice was confirmed by a written notice given 
to the teachers four days later, a time still more than 
four months before the charge was filed. 
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operative action of the District in increasing the number of 
work days of the teachers. The notice gave the Association no 
reason to expect that the teachers would be given compensatory 
time off for the June 1, 1982 work day. Accordingly, the charge 
was not timely. County of Monroe, 10 PERB 1f3104 (1977). 
The Association also asserts that the hearing officer erred 
in dismissing the specification of the charge on the ground of 
timeliness because the District had not raised that issue. 
Thus, according to the Association, an objection based upon 
timeliness was waived. 
We find no merit in this argument. Section 204.2(a) of our 
rules provides that the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation may dismiss the charge before assigning it to 
a hearing officer if, on its face, it is not timely. Once a 
charge has been referred to a hearing officer, it may be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not timely. The relevant 
provisions of §204.7(1) of our rules provide: 
A motion may be made to dismiss a charge, 
or the hearing officer may do so at his 
own initiative on the ground that the 
alleged violation occurred more than four 
months prior to the filing of the charge, 
but only if the failure of timeliness was 
first revealed during the hearing. An 
objection to the timeliness of the charge, 
if not duly raised, shall be deemed waived. 
Here, the facts as to the notice of May 13, 1982, constituting the 
operative action of the District in increasing the number of workdays 
of the teachers, were revealed at the hearing. Accordingly, the 
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hearing officer was authorized to dismiss the charge on his 
own motion on the ground that it was filed more than four 
months after May 13. 1982. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, 
and they hereby are. dismissed 
DATED: December 23, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
gfet* /cta^a— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Rand 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#10-12/23/83 
LOCAL 418. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-6511 
LUIS F. DIAZ. 
Charging Party. 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (MICHAEL J. 
SMITH, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
AUGUST J. GINOCCHIO. ESQ. AND LIPP & RUBIN. P.C. 
(DAVID S.J. RUBIN. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Luis F. Diaz was fired by Pilgrim State Psychiatric 
Center for patient abuse. Claiming an error on the part of 
the State, he asked Local 418, Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000, AFSCME. AFL-CIO (CSEA) to 
file a grievance on his behalf. CSEA did so. and it 
subsequently demanded arbitration. Apparently, however, 
the demand for arbitration was not timely filed and the 
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arbitrator dismissed the grievance on that ground. Diaz 
then asked CSEA to appeal the arbitrator's award, but CSEA 
refused to do so. 
Diaz then commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court 
under CPLR Article 75 against the State and CSEA seeking to 
set aside the arbitrator's action. Among other things, he 
alleged in that proceeding that CSEA violated its Taylor 
Law duty of fair representation in its handling of the 
grievance and that the arbitration award had been obtained 
by corruption or fraud. Without considering the merits of 
Diaz' complaints about CSEA and the State, the Court 
determined that the arbitrator took too narrow a view of 
his jurisdiction when he dismissed the charge. It vacated 
the arbitration award and allowed Diaz to pursue the 
regular negotiated grievance procedure. Both the State and 
CSEA appealed from that decision of the Court. CSEA argued 
that Diaz had no standing to seek review of the arbitration 
award because only it and the State were parties to the 
arbitration proceeding and could challenge the arbitration 
award. The Appellate Division agreed with CSEA and 
reversed the decision of the lower court. Diaz v. Pilgrim 
Psychiatric Center of the State of New York, et al., 
App. Div. (2d Dept.. 1983). 
The charge herein alleges that CSEA violated its duty 
of fair representation by refusing to accept the decision 
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of the Supreme Court which supports Diaz, and by taking an 
appeal from that decision.— Relying upon New York City 
School District. 15 PERB ir3136 (1982). the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
ruled that CSEft's participation in the appeal could not 
constitute an improper practice because a party is entitled 
to bring a lawsuit to adjudicate its claims. Accordingly, 
he dismissed the charge on the ground that it does not 
state a cause of action. The matter now comes to us on 
Diaz* exceptions to the Director's decision. 
We affirm the dismissal of the charge by the 
Director. There was a reasonable basis for CSEA's appeal 
of the decision of the Supreme Court, and as we said in 
New York City School District, "the commencement of a 
lawsuit itself cannot constitute an improper 
2/ practice."— Accordingly, we find that CSEA's mere 
participation in the appeal from the decision of the 
Supreme Court did not violate its duty of fair 
representation. 
I/we note that in another case (U-5998), which is 
pending before a hearing officer, Diaz complains that CSEA 
violated its duty of fair representation both by failing to 
demand arbitration in time and by refusing to appeal the 
decision of the arbitrator. 
2/see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB. 
U.S. (1983). 113 LRRM 2648. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: December 23, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
C^TE^O /0£un 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randl 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#1D-12/23/83 
JEFFERSONVILLE-YOUNGSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Respondent. 
- a n d - CASE NCK U - 6 3 4 1 
NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES GROUP, 
JEFFERSONVILLE-YOUNGSVILLE CENTRAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT FACULTY ASSOCIATION. 
INC. . 
Charging Party. 
SHELDON ROSENBERG. ESQ.. for Respondent 
C. FREDERICK OTT. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Jeffersonville-Youngsville Central School District (District) 
to a hearing officer's decision that it violated §209-a.l(d) 
by refusing to execute an agreement reached by its 
negotiating team. 
FACTS 
The Non-Instructional Employees Group. Jeffersonville-
Youngsville Central School District Faculty Association. Inc. 
(Association) and the District commenced negotiations in 
March 1981 for a collective bargaining agreement to succeed 
one which was due to expire on June 30, 1982. As the hearing 
officer found, it was understood and agreed to by both 
parties that any agreement reached by their respective 
negotiators would be submitted for ratification by both the 
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members of the Association and of the school board. 
The District's negotiating team consisted of Reilly, the 
District's superintendent, and Ridley. Umhoefer and Hess, 
three of the seven members of the school board. On 
January 21, 1982, the District's negotiating team indicated 
that it had offered as much money as it could for the first 
year, but that it was willing "to seek authority from its 
school board" to offer more than it had for the second year 
of a two-year agreement. It did so and received authority to 
offer an additional $2,000 for the second year. This 
information was not communicated to the Association when the 
parties met on February 17, 1982. During the course of 
negotiations on that day. Superintendent Reilly offered more 
than the additional $2,000 for the second year of the 
agreement and the Association accepted the offer. Ridley and 
Umhoefer, the two members of the District's negotiating team 
present on February 17. acknowledged to the Association that 
an agreement was reached on that day. Hess was not present 
at that meeting, but he supported the agreement throughout 
the subsequent events. 
Thereafter, on March 25. 1982, Superintendent Reilly and 
the Association reached an agreement on a schedule for the 
distribution of the salary increase accepted on February 17. 
The Association's membership ratified the agreement on 
June 3. 1982. The school board first considered the 
j 
agreement at an executive session held on June 2. 1982. Of 
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the District's negotiators. Superintendent Reilly and board 
members Ridley and Hess advocated ratification of the 
agreement at that time, but Umhoefer complained that the 
money offer was too great. Ratification was formally 
rejected on June 24, 1982 at a public meeting of the board. 
The board voted for Umhoefer's proposal that only the first 
year's salary increase of the agreement be approved. Her 
proposal received six votes including that of Ridley. Hess, 
who had proposed ratification of the agreement, and 
Superintendent Reilly, who was not authorized to do so, did 
not participate in the vote. Thereafter, Reilly refused the 
Association's demand to execute the memorandum of agreement. 
On these facts, the hearing officer determined that 
Reilly's refusal to execute the agreement constituted a 
violation of §209-a.l(d). In doing so, she relied upon this 
Board's decisions in Union Springs Central School Teachers 
Association. 6 PERB lf3074 (1973). and Harpursville Central 
School District. 14 PERB ir3003 (1980). In Union Springs this 
Board found that the failure of negotiators for an employee 
organization to support an agreement during the ratification 
process constitutes an improper practice. The focus of our 
Union Springs decision was clarified in Harpursville where we 
observed that not all members of a negotiating team are 
obligated to support every part of an agreement so long as 
the other party has not been misled by any member's ultimate 
dissenting position. The hearing officer found no evidence 
T #694 
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that any of the District's negotiators who subsequently voted 
against the salary agreement had previously made known to the 
Association their opposition to the agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
The District makes the following arguments in support of 
its exceptions. 
Union Springs is not applicable because there is no 
evidence that the proposal to reject the second year of the 
negotiated agreement contributed to the failure of 
ratification. The District contends that even if all three 
board members who were on the negotiating team had voted for 
ratification of the agreement, it would have been defeated by 
a four to three vote because the negotiators had agreed to 
give the employees more money than they had been authorized 
to give. 
We reject this argument. It is unnecessary to 
conjecture as to what each of the four remaining members of 
the school board would have done during the ratification vote 
if the three board members on the negotiating team had all 
supported the agreement. It is sufficient, as the hearing 
officer found, that the defection of two of the three board 
members generated an atmosphere which made rejection of the 
agreement easier. A clear corollary of our decision in 
Harpursville is that each member of a negotiating team is 
obligated to support every part of an agreement unless the 
other party has been advised that he dissented from the part 
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of the agreement which he subsequently opposed. 
The District's second argument is that no agreement was 
reached on February 17 because the offer made by the 
District's negotiators was not authorized by the school 
board. This argument is rejected on two grounds. First, it 
is based upon the erroneous assumption that a school board may 
deprive its superintendent of the authority given to him alone 
by the Taylor Law to negotiate collective bargaining 
agreements.— Second, assuming that the school board could 
restrict the authority of the superintendent and his 
negotiating team to conclude an agreement, there is no 
evidence that the school board communicated any restriction on 
) the authority of the District's negotiating team members to 
the Association, or that the District's negotiators advised 
the Association that the agreement they reached was beyond 
their authority. On the contrary, it is clear on the record 
that the Association reasonably anticipated that the District 
would publicly acknowledge the agreement. The Association was 
therefore entitled to rely upon the representations of the 
District's negotiators that an agreement had been concluded. 
Ulster County Community College. 4 PERB 1f3088 (1971). 
i/see subdivisions 10. 11 and 12 of §201 of the 
Taylor Law and City of Kingston. 15 PERB ir8009 (1982). 
affirmed City of Kingston v. PERB. 16 PERB T7002 (Sup. Ct. . 
Albany Co.. 1983). for the statutory relationship of the 
chief executive officer (superintendent) and the 
legislative body (school board) of a public employer. 
Board - U-6341 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER the District: 
1. to cease and desist from refusing to 
negotiate in good faith; 
2. to execute the memorandum of agreement, 
including the salary distribution 
schedule reached on March 25. 1982 and, 
upon request, incorporate its contents 
in a formal signed contract between the 
parties; and 
3. to sign and post the attached notice at 
all locations used by it for 
communications to the members of the 
bargaining unit. 
DATED: December 23. 1983 
Albany. New York 
R. Newman. Chairman 
gfcf./r&^cu 
Ida Klaus, Member 
'David C/Randies. Member 
1&97 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPL 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify t n e employees of the Jeffersonville-Youngsville Central School 
District (District) in the unit represented by the Non-Instructional Employees 
Group, Jeffersonville-Youngsville CentraLSchool District Faculty Association, Inc. 
(Association) that: 
1. the District shall not refuse to negotiate in good faith with 
the Association; and 
2. the Superintendent of Schools will execute the memorandum of 
agreement, including salary distribution schedule, reached with the 
Association on March 25, 1982 and, upon Association request, 
incorporate its contents in a formal signed contract with the 
Association. 
Jeffersonville-Youngsville C.S.D. 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
*• '8698 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HUNTER-TANNERSVILLE TEACHERS' #1E-12/23/83 
ASSOCIATION. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6576 
HUNTER-TANNERSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Charging Party. 
HAROLD FAIRBANKS, for Respondent. 
HANCOCK. ESTABROOK, RYAN. SHOVE & HUST, ESQS. 
(JAMES P. BURNS III, ESQ, of Counsel), for 
^ Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 11. 1983 the Hunter-Tannersville Central 
School District (District) filed an improper practice 
charge alleging that the Hunter-Tannersville Teachers 
Association (Association) violated §209-a.2 of the Taylor 
Law by refusing to negotiate a proposal to examine 
alternatives to the State-wide health insurance plan 
presently covering unit employees. The charge indicated 
that the District and the Association were parties to an 
agreement which was still in effect and which dealt with 
\ the subject of health insurance. According to the 
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District, that agreement provided for a reopener on health 
insurance in the following words: 
The Association and the Superintendent of 
Schools or his designee shall meet to examine 
insurance coverage offered by other 
companies. If the committee finds and agrees 
to a different bona fide insurance company 
offering no less than the present maximum 
insurance coverage at a lesser cost to the 
District than the present insurance plan, it 
will be adopted in the^second and third year 
of this contract. An acceptable alternative 
may be a self insurance program. 
Acting pursuant to §204.2(a) of our Rules of 
Procedure, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) notified the Association on 
February 3. 1983 that the charge had been filed, that a 
hearing officer had been assigned and that an answer to 
the charge or an appropriate motion should be forwarded to 
the hearing officer.— 
On February 15. 1983. the Association filed an answer 
to the charge. In that answer it admitted having agreed 
to a reopener on health insurance and it asserted two 
defenses to the District's charge. The first was that its 
conduct had satisfied "its responsibility to negotiate in 
good faith . . . ." The second was that the charge was 
1/section 204.2(a) of our rules provides that the 
Director shall dismiss the charge if he determines "that 
the facts as alleged do not. as a matter of law, 
constitute a violation." Otherwise he shall assign a 
hearing officer to consider the merits of the charge. 
--? 8700 
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premature in that the impasse resolution procedures 
provided by §209 of the Taylor Law had not yet been 
invoked. 
After holding a pre-hearing conference, the hearing 
officer determined that the language of the parties' 
agreement, which ostensibly constituted a reopener on 
health insurance, was ambiguous. Relying upon our 
decisions in Levittown, 13 PERB 1f3014 (1980), and State of 
New York. 13 PERB 1P106 (1980). she then dismissed the 
charge. In both those cases, we dismissed charges which 
alleged a refusal to negotiate pursuant to a contract 
reopener on the ground that the alleged reopener was 
ambiguous and that we would not interpret the parties' 
agreement to ascertain whether there was a relevant 
reopener. The hearing officer understood our decisions in 
Levittown and State of New York as holding that we lack 
jurisdiction to interpret the parties' agreement and that 
we are therefore without power to require a party to 
negotiate pursuant to a contractual reopener unless the 
reopener is absolutely explicit. Under this analysis, the 
Association's acknowledgment that it had agreed to a 
reopener is irrelevant as the parties could not bestow 
jurisdiction upon this Board by their pleadings where it 
is not bestowed by law. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
District, which contend, among other things, that the 
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hearing officer has misconstrued Levittown and State of 
2/ New York.— It argues that the hearing officer could 
have, and should have, determined that the parties agreed 
upon a contract reopener. We find merit in this argument. 
The statutory limitation on the jurisdiction of this 
Board with respect to the interpretation of collective 
bargaining agreements is set forth in §205.5(d) of the 
Taylor Law. It provides that: 
the board shall not have authority to enforce 
an agreement between an employer and an 
employee organization and shall not exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such 
an agreement that would not otherwise 
constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization practice. 
There is nothing in this language which precludes this 
Board from ordering an employee organization or a public 
employer to negotiate pursuant to a contract reopener 
provision. Neither does the statute preclude this Board 
from interpreting the agreement to ascertain whether it 
contains a relevant reopener. 
The Board's view of the statutory policy is 
explicated in St. Lawrence County. 10 PERB 1f3058 (1977). 
i-/ln a consolidated decision, the hearing officer 
also dismissed a related charge (U-6710). made by the 
Association, that the District unilaterally changed the 
health insurance plan. The Association has not filed 
exceptions to this part of the hearing officer's decision. 
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which adopted the dissenting opinion in Town of 
Oranqetown. 8 PERB 1P042 (1975). These decisions hold 
that while this Board does not have broad jurisdiction 
simply to interpret collective bargaining agreements, it 
may do so in the exercise of its basic authority to 
determine whether there has been a statutory violation. 
For example, this Board held in St. Lawrence County that 
it may determine "whether an employee organization has 
waived its right to negotiate on a particular subject so 
as to permit unilateral action by an employer." 
Similarly, here, we may interpret a collective bargaining 
agreement to determine whether an employee organization 
has waived its right not to negotiate on a particular 
subject covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
Levittown and State of New York do not hold that we 
lack jurisdiction to interpret an agreement to ascertain 
whether it contains a relevant reopener. They indicate 
only that we may exercise our discretion to decline to do 
so. Section 205.5(d) of the Taylor Law limits our 
authority to interpret agreements except where a violation 
of the agreement would otherwise constitute an improper 
practice. It does not, however, require us to do so in 
all instances where an improper practice may be involved, 
thus leaving to us the discretion to assert or withhold 
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exercise of our jurisdiction. Even before the amendment 
of §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law to include the above-quoted 
3/ language,— we had declined to exercise jurisdiction 
over an alleged improper practice. In New York City 
Trans it Authority (Bordansky). 4 PERBir3031 (1971). we did 
so because the parties had a contractually-provided remedy 
4/ 
available to them.— 
In Levittown and State of New York we exercised our 
discretion and refused to interpret an ambiguous clause of 
a collective bargaining agreement because other 
appropriate forums were available to make such an 
interpretation. Here, however, it is indisputably clear 
from the pleadings with respect to the improper practice 
charged that the parties have agreed upon a relevant 
reopener. 
Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the hearing 
officer to ascertain by appropriate procedures, including 
a hearing if necessary, whether the Association has 
violated its statutory duty to negotiate pursuant to that 
reopener. 
3/L. 1977, C. 429. 
i-Zcompare the declination of jurisdiction by the 
NLRB as noted in NLRB v. Pease Oil Co.. 279 F2d 135. 46 
LRRM 2286 (2d Cir.. 1963). 
-r -gym 
Board - U-6576 -7 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is. remanded to the 
hearing officer for further 
proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
DATED: December 23. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SWEET HOME CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT... #2F-12/23/83 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6231 
SWEET HOME ASSOCIATION OF SUBSTITUTE 
TEACHERS. NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
GROSS, SHUMAN, BRIZDLE. LAUB & GILFILLAN. P.C. 
(ROBERT J. FELDMAN. ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
CHARLES J. RACCUIA. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Sweet 
Home Central School District (District) to a hearing 
officer's decision that it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
when it refused to negotiate with the Sweet Home Association 
of Substitute Teachers. NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO (Association). 
The parties submitted the case to the hearing officer on the 
pleadings and a stipulation of facts. 
On June 7. 1982, this Board certified the Association as 
representative of a unit consisting of "all per diem 
'-r 870 
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substitute teachers who in the immediately preceding school 
year received the reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment referred to in Civil Service Law §201.7(d)."— 
Shortly thereafter, the Association asked the District to set 
a date for the commencement of negotiations. The District 
replied by denying any obligation to negotiate, claiming that 
since it had not sent a letter containing an offer or 
assurance of continuing employment to any per diem 
substitute, none were covered by the definition of the 
certified unit. 
The parties stipulated that in each June preceding the 
1979-80. 1980-81 and 1981-82 school years, the District 
forwarded written assurances of continuing employment to 
virtually all of its approximately 120 per diem substitutes. 
It chose not to do so with regard to employment for the 
1982-83 school year. The District did. however, make 
telephone inquiries during the summer preceding that term "to 
a number of its 1981-82 per diem substitute teachers to 
determine their availability for the 1982-83 school year." 
In addition, it was stipulated that many of the 120 
i/Under §201.7(d). a substitute teacher is a public 
employee entitled to Taylor Law representation rights if he 
or she has been given "a reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment" which is sufficient under §590.10 of the Labor 
Law to disqualify the substitute from receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
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substitutes who were employed by the District during the 
1982-83 school year had worked for the District in that 
capacity for nine or more years, including the 1980-81 and 
1981-82 school terms. 
In finding a violation, the hearing officer deemed 
immaterial the fact that eighteen substitutes did receive 
unemployment insurance benefits during the summer of 1982. 
Relying upon decisions and opinions of the State Labor 
Department and the courts, he found that the stipulated facts 
established that a number of the per diem substitutes had 
received "reasonable assurance" from the District. In this 
regard, he, inter alia, drew an inference that the District 
kept a record of the names and responses of those substitutes 
that it telephoned and found that this would have been 
sufficient to disqualify these substitutes from receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits under §590.10 of the Labor 
Law. The District takes exception to each of these findings 
and also points to the absence of evidence that any substitute 
was actually disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance 
benefits during the summer of 1982. 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. The 
receipt of unemployment insurance benefits by eighteen of the 
substitutes is not dispositive. This fact might have been 
material had the record established that these substitutes 
received benefits despite having received an availability 
inquiry from the District. That situation might have given 
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rise to an implication that the telephone inquiries were 
insufficient to disqualify the substitutes from receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits. In the present case, however, 
there is no evidence that any of the eighteen recipients were 
among those telephoned. As regards the absence of evidence 
that any substitute was actually disqualified from receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits, we do not read CSL §201.7(d) 
as requiring that per diem substitutes must apply and be 
rejected for such benefits before this Board can find that 
representation rights exist. Certainly, any substitutes who 
believe that they have been given reasonable assurance and that 
they are thereby ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits 
are not likely to apply for such benefits. 
Since per diem substitutes are entitled to representation 
rights only if they have received "reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment" in accordance with §590.10 of the Labor 
Law. the hearing officer properly turned to the decisions and 
opinions of the Labor Department's Unemployment Insurance 
Division, the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, and the 
courts for authority regarding the interpretation of that 
statutory term. Our reading of those decisions and opinions 
persuades us that the District gave such reasonable assurance 
to a number of its per diem substitutes. While the cases are, 
as the District argues, factually distinguishable, the hearing 
officer specifically recognized this and cited them only for 
the general criteria and principles set out therein. 
Board - U-6231 
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The decisions and opinions of the Labor Department and 
the courts have construed "reasonable assurance" in very 
broad terms. It may be given orally, there being "no 
requirement in the Law that such assurance be in 
2/ 
writing."— Placement of a substitute's name on a list of 
eligible substitutes is clear evidence that reasonable 
3/ 
assurance has been tendered,— but actual placement on such 
a list is not a sine qua non. A school district's mere 
"inquiry of interest", in various forms, has been held 
sufficient in the absence of evidence of actual 
4/ placement.— Both a district's need for per diem 
substitutes and a claimant's history and experience as a 
5/ 
substitute with a district are taken into account.— The 
intention to employ for the next school term may be implied 
and even conditional provided that the claimant is 
£/Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board No. 327183; 
State Labor Department. Unemployment Insurance Division, 
Special Bulletin A-710-53 (4/25/78) at p. 6. 
"yUnemployment Insurance Appeals Board Nos. 284001A, 
327153, and 327180; Matter of Williams (Ross). 81 AD2d 928 
(3d Dept.. 1981). mt. lv. app. den.. 54 NY2d 608 (1981). 
^/unemployment Insurance Appeals Board No. 304702; 
Matter of Scully (Roberts). 88 AD2d 689 (3d Dept., 1982). 
.^/Special Bulletin A-710-53. supra at p. 12; Matter 
of Wilson (Ross). 80 AD2d 980 (3d Dept.. 1981). mt. lv. 
app. den., 54 NY2d 606 (1981). 
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6 / 
unlikely to be affected by the condition.— 
In accordance with these principles, we find that the 
telephone calls made by the District to a number of its per 
diem substitutes, inquiring as to their availability for 
employment in that capacity during the 1982-83 school term, 
strongly implied that these substitutes had a likelihood and 
legitimate expectation of continuing employment with the 
District. The implication is especially obvious when the 
inquiries are viewed in light of both the District's 
recurring need for per diem substitutes and its use of many 
of the same substitutes for many consecutive years. We 
believe these circumstances are sufficient to constitute 
"reasonable assurance" within the meaning of §590.10 of the 
Labor Law and §201.7(d) of the Act. Given this combination 
of factors, we do not believe it was necessary for the 
hearing officer to additionally infer that a list or record 
of those telephoned was maintained by the District. We 
nevertheless agree that the inference drawn was a reasonable 
one. Since the purpose of the telephone inquiries was to 
ascertain availability for future employment, it is difficult 
to envision that a list or record of the names and responses 
was not maintained.-
6/special Bulletin No. A-710-53, supra at pp. 6-7. 
27 In this regard, we note that the District has not 
asserted in any of its papers that such a list or record 
was not made. 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER the Sweet Home Central School 
District to negotiate in good faith with 
the Sweet Home Association of Substitute 
Teachers. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO and to 
sign and post a notice in the form 
annexed hereto at all locations 
ordinarily used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: December 23, 1983 
Albany, New York 
• 7 ^ ^ d5jP/£ //6&**4*1 -
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies. Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify a 1 1 employees in the unit represented by the Sweet 
Home Association of Substitute Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association) that we will negotiate in good faith with the 
Association. 
Sweet Home Central School District 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#2(3-12/23/83 
LOCKPORT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2679 




BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 17, 1983, the Lockport Administrators and 
Supervisors Association/School Administrators Association 
(petitioner) filed a timely petition for certification as the 
exclusive negotiating representative of certain 
administrative employees of the Lockport City School District 
(employer). 
A secret ballot election was held on December 6, 1983. 
pursuant to a consent agreement in which the parties 
stipulated the following as the appropriate negotiating unit: 
Included: High School Principal; High School 
Assistant Principal; Junior High 
School Principal; Junior High School 
Assistant Principal. Elementary 
Principal, Director of Physical 
Education. Sports & Safety. 
Excluded: Superintendent; Assistant Superin-
tendent; Assistant to Superintendent 
for Management Services; Assistant 
to Superintendent for Staff & Pupil 
Personnel Services. 
7.-T- v > 
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The results of the election indicate that a majority of 
eligible voters in the unit do not desire to be represented 
by the petitioner.-
THEREFORE. IT IS ORDERED that the petition be. and it 
hereby is. DISMISSED. 
Dated: Albany. New York, 
December 23, 1983 
^W-t^/f^/^ £&^jfe>#. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<^U> PA 
Ida Klaus, Member 
^^*Q f 
1/ Of the fifteen ballots cast, seven were for and eight 
were against representation by the petitioner. There 
were no challenged ballots. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MUNICIPAL HOUSING AUTHORITY FOR THE 
CITY OF YONKERS. NEW YORK, #2A-12/23/83 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2673 
LOCAL 456. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
WESTCHESTER LOCAL 8 60. CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSN., AFSCME. LOCAL 1000, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that^a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
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upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit Included: 
Excluded: 
All maintenance and janitorial 
employees 
Administrative personnel, office 
personnel. Building 
Superintendents, and all other 
employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: December 23. 198 3 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
C%4^ /*r&!U*<4. 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Handles, Member 
-3 ^J 
